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TO BE A EUROPEAN CITIZEN - EROS AND CIVILIZATION
* 
JHH WEILER 
MANLEY HUDSON PROFESSOR OF LAW AND JEAN MONNET CHAIR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
 
Prologue 
The challenging tensions between national consciousness and multi-cultural 
sensibility take place not only within the classical State but also at the transnational level, of 
which the European Union is one of the most developed. A focal point is the recent 
discussion concerning European Citizenship. The 1992 Treaty of European Union (The 
Maastricht Treaty) introduced the concept. Its citizenship clause provided: “Citizenship of 
the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union.” The recent 1997 Draft Amsterdam Treaty modified the 
Maastricht Citizenship Clause by adding the phrase "[c]itizenship of the Union shall 
complement and not replace national citizenship."  
This is a trite, banal phrase. But it reflects a profound anxiety and offers a literary 
device with which to address, analytically and normatively, some of the deepest dilemmas in 
constructing the ends and means of transnational integration within the framework of the 
European Union. One way of describing this essay is to say that in it I want to explore the 
anxiety and offer a normative interpretation of this provision, not what the provision means, 
but what it ought to mean. 
But there is more to European citizenship (and to this essay). The ever growing 
discussion on the politics of European citizenship has an exquisite Janus like quality. For 
  2many the concept is considered one of the least successful aspects of Maastricht, trivial and 
empty, and hence irrelevant. From this perspective, those who believe in it are engaged in 
wishful thinking and those who fear it suffer from paranoid delusion. On this view, the 
recent modification was another unnecessary and empty gesture placating dreamers and 
loonies. For others, European citizenship is an important symbol with far-reaching potential 
and dangers. The story of European integration is, after all, replete with ideas and policies 
which, at inception, seemed trivial and empty, but which later attained a life of their own. 
From this perspective the Powers-that-be made a Pascal-like wager. Empty and irrelevant 
maybe. But why take risks? 
The two views are not altogether contradictory and I wish to track and explain 
elements of both. I have no interest in making predictions about the future of the concept 
and its attendant policies. But to the extent that ideas and symbols shape attitudes and, 
maybe even policy options, the discourse of European citizenship is important not only to 
the theory of European integration but also to its praxis. In this essay I build on work I have 
done in this field since 1995 though, in one fundamental respect - the articulation of the 
relationship between Member State nationality and Community citizenship - I have 
modified my earlier position significantly. 
European Citizenship - Dilemmas and Contradictions 
With inimitable acerbity, Perry Anderson begins his essay "Under the Sign of the 
Interim" as follows: 
Mathematically, the European Union today represents the largest single unit in the world economy. It 
has a nominal GNP of about $6 trillion compared with $5 trillion for the US and $3 trillion for Japan. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
*An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Journal of European Public Policy 495 (1997). Lecture style 
has been preserved and citations are given for direct quotes only. My many intellectual debts are 
acknowledged in the bibliography. 
  3Its total population, now over 360 million, approaches that of the United States and Japan combined. 
Yet in political terms such magnitudes continue to be virtual reality. Beside Washington or Tokyo, 
Brussels remains a cipher. The Union is no equivalent to either the United States or Japan, since it is 
not a sovereign state. But what kind of formation is it? Most Europeans themselves are at a loss for an 
answer. The Union remains a more or less unfathomable mystery to all but a handful of those who, to 
their bemusement, have recently become its citizens. It is well-nigh entirely arcane to ordinary voters; 
a film of mist covers it even in the mirror of scholars. 
 
And bemused they should be. It was Maastricht which bestowed the august title of 
"European Citizen" on Member State nationals. Even the handful for whom the Union is, 
perhaps, less than an unfathomable mystery, would have to admit to some perplexity at this 
new innovation. Citizens of the Union were to enjoy the rights conferred by the TEU Treaty 
and be subject to the duties imposed thereby. But the Citizenship chapter itself seemed to 
bestow precious few rights, hardly any that were new, and some explicitly directed at all 
residents and not confined to citizens. Even if we were to take the entire gamut of rights 
(duties are usually forgotten in most accounts of European citizenship) granted under the 
Treaties to European citizens we would be struck by the poverty of provisions normally 
considered as political and associated with citizenship. Thus, we find (unrealized) promises 
of true free movement and residence throughout the European Union situated uncomfortably 
with relatively trivial guarantees of political participation in local and European Parliament 
elections for those Community citizens taking advantage of those very partial freedoms. 
And whereas the discipline of a European Common Marketplace in which goods would 
circulate freely was long understood (even if resisted in practice) as necessitating a 
European Common External Tariff towards the rest of the world, the same logic - internal 
free movement and residence requiring a Common European "membership" policy - has 
been rejected. European Citizenship emphatically does not mean what it has come to mean 
in all federal States: A "communatirization" of the actual grant of citizenship or even an 
  4harmonization of Member State conditions for such grant. The exclusive gate-keepers 
remain the Member States.  
The question of "added value" cannot but be raised: With very few exceptions, the 
rights (and duties) associated with European citizenship predated Maastricht. In the past 
they attached to Nationals of the Member States. Given the way this saga has evolved, what 
if anything, we may ask, has been gained by adding a new concept, Citizenship, to a pre-
exiting package of rights and duties rather than, as one may (or might) have expected adding 
new rights and duties to a concept? And the 'What?' leads to a rather big 'Why?' If the 
Powers-that-be had, as is evident, no intention of substantially enlarging those rights and 
duties already attaching to nationals of their respective Member States; if they had no 
intention of making in relation to humans that critical move that was made in relation to 
goods, why do anything at all? 
There are even deeper dilemmas than this political riddle. Citizenship and nationality 
are more than an element in the mechanics of political organization. We live in an era - 
perhaps the entire century -- obsessed with questions of individual and collective identity. 
The treatment of the celebrated "other" the other in our selves, in our midst, and the other 
clamoring at our doors or shores is an issue extremely high on the public agenda in most 
European societies.  
Interestingly, as we slouch towards a new fin-de-siècle, after close to fifty years of 
European integration, the captivating idea of nation and people have retained a surprising 
amount of their astonishing allure and grip on our collective psyches. And I do not only 
refer to the new found nationalisms in the "Alt-Neu" Europe of the East. Is the European 
debate in Great Britain really moved by economic differences on the desirability of EMU or, 
  5instead, by political differences concerning, identity and control of national destiny? Was 
the debate over Maastricht in France (which split the electorate straight down the middle) or 
Denmark (who voted against) not about the same thing? And is it mere teasing to suggest 
that Fin-de-Siècle Vienna - première edition circa 1900 boasted a far more cosmopolitan 
Geist than its current miserable shadow 100 years later? 
The fault lines of this debate are usually not about differences in the self-
understanding of the nation and the State. Typically in these debates many of the 
integrationists proclaim, usually in good faith, to be deeply concerned with, and committed 
to, national identity and national welfare and all the rest. They simply argue that the 
European Union will enhance these goals and values rather than threaten them.  
Despite this attachment, the vocabulary of citizenship - nationality - peoplehood, the 
classical concepts from the armory of statecraft and political theory which address these 
issues, the only ones we have, seem to provoke complicated reactions. The words - nation, 
people, citizenry - often strike us as cynical when uttered by our political masters -- as in 
'The British people do not want ...,' pernicious when employed by the far Right of Le Pen or 
Haider, and embarrassing when discussed in good society other than to denounce them. 
Who will admit to being a nationalist - the very word is pejorative. And in an environment 
which worships at the alter of multiculturalism, who will own up to a thick concept of 
peoplehood or even citizenship? And if one does own up it is only to imagine a society of 
"others" (How greedy and cruel of some - usually comfortably positioned - to rob the real 
"others" of their "otherness" by claiming that we are all "others"). 
This ambivalence may explain why the introduction in the Treaty of Maastricht of a 
European Citizenship has struck so many not simply as bemusing but as problematic. At one 
  6level and to some it symbolized yet another bold encroachment on the National by its worst 
antagonist the Supranational. At a deeper level it seemed to be tinkering with one of the very 
foundations of European integration.  
If, indeed, the traditional, classical vocabulary of citizenship is the vocabulary of the 
State, the Nation and Peoplehood, its very introduction into the discourse of European 
integration is problematic for it conflicts with one of Europe's articles of faith, encapsulated 
for decades in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome. Mystery, mist and mirrors 
notwithstanding, one thing has always seemed clear: That the Community and Union were 
about "... lay[ing] the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." 
Not the creation of one people, but the union of many. In that Europe was always different 
from all federal states which, whether in the USA, Germany, Australia and elsewhere, whilst 
purporting to preserve all manner of diversity, real and imaginary, always insisted on the 
existence of a single people at the federal level. The introduction of citizenship understood 
in its classical vocabulary could mean, then, a change in the very Telos of European 
integration from a union among the peoples of Europe to a people of Europe. With the 
change of the Telos, would commence - some would hope, others fear - a process which 
would eventually result in people thinking of themselves as European in the same way they 
think of themselves today as French or Italian. Citizens of Europe, would become, not only 
formally, but in their consciousness, European citizens.  
The introduction of European citizenship to the discourse of European integration 
could, however, mean not that the Telos of European integration has changed, but that our 
understanding of national membership has changed, is changing, or ought to change - 
possibilities that have been discussed widely at the national and European level, most 
  7recently in a comprehensive work by the British scholar Jo Shaw. It would be changing 
because of a change in our understanding of the State and the nation as well as a change in 
our self-understanding and our understanding of the self. If Citizenship classically postulates 
a Sovereign State, is it not anachronistic to introduce it in an age in which, as McCormick 
has shown so lucidly sovereignty itself has become fragmented, and, States constitutionally 
cannot even pretend to have control over their most classical functions: Provision of 
material welfare and personal and collective security?  
Think, too, of the linguistic trio - Identity, Identical, Identify. Surely no self is 
identical to another. It is trite to recall that identity - in an age where for long Choice has 
replaced Fate as the foundation for self-understanding is, to a large extent, a political and 
social construct which privileges one (or one set of) characteristic(s) over all others, calls on 
the self to identify with that, and is then posited as identity. It is equally trite to recall that 
the modern self has considerable problems with the move from Identical to Identity to 
Identify. I may be German, or Italian or French. But is that my Identity? What about being 
Male or Female? Or a Stones lover or Beetles lover (Verdi or Mozart, if you wish)? As the 
referents of identity grow, would it not be more accurate, in relation to the Self today, to talk 
of my differentity? 
This construct should not be confused with Multiculturalism, in some way it is its 
opposite. Whether in the USA or Hungary the labeling of people as black, or Whitemale, or 
Jew et cetera as a basis for group political entitlement is the celebration of a bureaucratically 
sanctioned polity of "multi-cultural" groups composed of mono-culturally identified 
individuals - the antithesis of individual differentity.  
  8Constructing, then, a new concept of Citizenship around the Fragmented sovereignty 
of the porous State and the Fractured Self of the individuals who comprise those "States" - 
Citizenship as a hall mark of differentity - could have been and could still be a fitting project 
for Union architects. That would be the major challenge to the conceptualization of 
European Citizenship. Especially, since accepting and celebrating the differentity of 
individuals offers a new lease of life to the nation - nationality becoming a legitimate rather 
than oppressive bond among the individuals comprising the nation.  
Such an architecture will have to explore both the shape of the construct and the 
technologies to sustain it. In the remainder of this lecture I will explore some of the 
available approaches and will offer my own variant too. 
The Affective Crisis of European Citizenship 
As we shall see, the introduction of European citizenship is brought about by a deep 
sense of malaise and public disaffection with the European construct which threatened to 
undermine its political legitimacy. Understanding this disaffection is an important 
background to the subsequent unfolding saga of constitutional engineering.  
The expression of the disaffection were manifest in the reaction to the Treaty of 
European Union - a public reaction which ranged from the hostile through the bewildered to 
the indifferent. The discontent was not with the Treaty itself - it was with the condition of 
Europe itself. What accounts for this attitude? For this change in fortune towards the idea of 
European integration? 
There is, first, what one could term the paradox of success. In its foundational 
period, the European construct was perceived as part of a moral imperative in dealing with 
the heritage of World War II. Governments and states may have been happily pursuing their 
  9national interest but the European construct could be cloaked with a noble mantle of a new-
found idealism. Rendering war as neither possible or thinkable and restoring economic 
prosperity in a framework of transnational social solidarity were key elements of that 
idealism. But once achieved, once you remove the moral imperative and it's politics as usual 
with the frustrating twist that in Europe you cannot throw the scoundrels out at election 
time. So you try and throw the whole construct out. 
Arguably, public attitudes go even deeper than that. We come here to a more 
sobering consideration in this regard, whereby the European Union may be seen not simply 
as having suffered a loss of its earlier spiritual values, but as an actual source of social 
ressentiment. Here are the highlights of what surely deserves much more than this 
superficial summary. In his pre-choleric days, Ernst Nolte wrote a fascinating study on the 
origins of fascism in its various European modes. Consider, chillingly, the turn to fascism in 
Italy, France and Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. In his profound comparative 
analysis of the cultural-political roots of the phenomenon, the common source was identified 
as a reaction to some of the manifestations of modernity.  
At a pragmatic level, the principal manifestations of modernity were the increased 
bureaucratization of life, public and private; the depersonalization of the market (through 
mass consumerism, brand names and the like) and the commodification of values; the 
"abstractism" of social life, especially through competitive structures of mobility; rapid 
urbanization and the centralization of power.  
At an epistemological level modernity was premised on, and experienced in, an 
attempt to group the world into intelligible concepts which had to be understood through 
reason and science - abstract and universal categories. On this reading, fascism was a 
  10response to, and an exploitation of, the angst generated by these practical and cognitive 
challenges. So far this is a fairly well known story. 
Eerily, at the end of the 20th century, European Union can be seen as replicating, in 
reality or in the subjective perception of individuals and societies, some of these very same 
features: It has come to symbolize, unjustly perhaps, the epitome of bureaucratization and, 
likewise, the epitome of centralization. One of its most visible policies, the Common 
Agriculture Policy, has had historically the purpose of "rationalizing" farm holdings which, 
in effect, meant urbanization. The single market, with its emphasis on competitiveness and 
transnational movement of goods, can be perceived as a latter day thrust at increased 
commodification of values (consider how the logic of the Community forces a topic such as 
abortion to be treated as a "service") and depersonalization of, this time round, the entire 
national market. Not only have local products come under pressure, even national products 
have lost their distinctiveness. The very transnationalism of the Community, which earlier 
on was celebrated as a reinvention of Enlightenment idealism, is just that: Universal, 
rational, transcendent, and wholly modernist. 
To this sustained and never resolved angst of modernity we have new, fin de siècle 
added phenomena as illuminated brilliantly by Brian Fitzgerald. To capture these 
phenomena we can resort to what Jose Ortega y Gasset called creencias - the certainties of 
life which needed no proof - both in the physical and social world: Water falls downward, 
there is a difference between machines and humans, higher forms of life differentiate by 
gender, etc. To the sustained challenge of modernity is added a profound shattering of the 
most fundamental creencias - deeper still, a shattering of the ability to believe in anything. It 
is worth tracing some of the manifestations of this process. 
  11There is first, or was, for a sustained period in this century, the assault of the 
reductive social sciences. Not only are things not what they seem to be, but their reality 
always has a cynical malevolence. Public life and its codes mask power and exploitation; 
private life with its codes masks domination. By an inevitable logic this assault turned on 
itself, whereby the illumination brought by these insights was not a vehicle for liberation but 
in itself for manipulation. The epistemic challenge of post-modernism deepens the 
shattering. For, in the old, modernist perspectives, there was at least a truth to be explored, 
vindicated -- even if that truth was one of power, exploitation and domination. One can find 
distasteful the post-modernist self-centered, ironic, sneering posturing. But, without 
adjudicating the philosophical validity of its epistemic claim, there is no doubt that the 
notion that all observations are relative to the perception of the observer, that what we have 
are just competing narratives, has moved from being a philosophic position to a social 
reality. It is part of political discourse: Multiculturalism is premised on it as are the 
breakdown of authority (political, scientific, social) and the ascendant culture of extreme 
individualism and subjectivity. Indeed, objectivity itself is considered a constraint on 
freedom - a strange freedom, to be sure, empty of content. Finally, the shattering of so many 
creencias (of the notion of creencia itself) has found a powerful manifestation in the public 
forum: It is dominated by television which distrusts and, by its pandering, non-judgmental 
transmission or cheap moralization, itself undermines creencias. This occurs in a vertical 
forum in which each viewer is isolated and addressed alone, unable to hear and join the 
objections of other viewers. To the angst of modernity is added the end of century 
fragmentation of information, and the disappearance of coherent world view, belief in belief 
and belief in the ability to know let alone control. 
  12There are many social responses to these phenomena. One of them has been a turn, 
by many, to any force which seems to offer "meaning." Almost paradoxically, but perhaps 
not, the continued pull of the nation state, and the success in many societies of extreme 
forms of nationalism (measured not only in votes and members but in the ability of those 
extreme forms to shift the center of the public debate) are, in part of course, due to the fact 
that the nation and state are such powerful vehicles in responding to the existential craving 
for meaning and purpose which modernity and post-modernity seem to deny. The nation and 
state, with their organizing myths of fate and destiny, provide a captivating and reassuring 
answer to many.  
Here too the failure of Europe is colossal. Just as Europe fuels the angst of modernity 
it also feeds the angst of post-modernity: Giant and fragmented at the same time, built as 
much on image as on substance, it is incomprehensible and challenges increasingly the 
creencias of national daily life. This is not to suggest that Europe is about to see a return to 
fascism, nor most certainly should this analysis, if it has any merit, give joy to fin-de-siècle 
chauvinists, whose wares today are as odious as they were at the start of the century. But it 
does suggest a profound change in its positioning in public life: Not, as in its founding 
period, as a response to a crisis of confidence, but 50 years later as one of the causes of that 
crisis. 
In the realm of the symbolic, citizenship should reflect the ethos of the polity. If 
European citizenship should serve as an icon of identification, if this is what Europe has 
become - what is one identifying with? On this reading the collective enterprise of 
constructing or redefining a European citizenship is part and parcel of constructing and 
  13redefining a European ethos. How disappointing to observe the response of the powers-that-
be. 
To be a European Citizen: The Official, Bread and Circus Vision 
There is a legend about the genesis of Article 8 according to which the issue of 
citizenship was far from the mind of the drafters of the TEU until the very last minutes when 
one Prime Minister (Felipe Gonzalez according to this legend), unhappy with the non-EMU 
parts of the Treaty, and conscious of the brewing legitimacy crisis in the European street, 
suggested that something be done about citizenship. A skeptical Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) quickly cobbled the Citizenship "Chapter" in response. It is, of course, a 
legend. IGCs do not happen in that way as pointed out in O'Leary's admirable new book. 
But it could be true to judge from the content of Article 8. 
As already mentioned, as is a common place, the treatment of European Citizenship 
both in the TEU itself and, subsequently, by the Institutions and the Member States of the 
Union, is an embarrassment. The seriousness of this notion -- after all the cornerstone of our 
democratic polities -- and its fundamental importance to the self-understanding and 
legitimacy of the Union are only matched by its trivialization at the hands of the powers-
that-be. One has to believe that the High Contracting Parties understood the fundamental 
nature of citizenship in redefining the nature of the Union -- and it is this understanding, 
rather than misunderstanding which lead them to the desultory Article 8 and its aftermath. 
Which returns us to the "Why" question. Why, indeed, open Pandora's box at all? 
The recently concluded IGC offers us two clear clues. In the Commission's input to 
the Reflection Group we find the first: In the eyes of the Commission the two key values 
which make Union Citizenship most worthy and, thus, worth developing to the full are: a. 
  14that citizenship reinforces and renders more tangible the individual's sentiment of belonging 
to the Union; and b. that citizenship confers on the individual citizen rights which tie him to 
the Union. It is endearing and telling that the Commission describes the relationship 
between Union and Citizens using the terminology of ownership, and that it is the citizen 
which belongs to the Union. When the Irish Presidency put out its mid term report on the 
IGC this Freudian glissage was corrected. It is Europe which belongs to citizens, we were 
assured this time in the very opening statement of the Document. And this was followed by 
"[t]he Treaties establishing the Union should address their most direct concerns. These were 
then listed as respect for fundamental rights, full employment et cetera. This approach is 
followed through in the new Amsterdam Treaty. There is, on my reading, only a semantic 
difference in these two official statements which is echoed in similar statements from 
Council and even Parliament. 
What is the political culture and ethos which explain a concept of citizenship which, 
for example, speaks of duties but lists none? Which speaks of the rights of citizens but not of 
empowering them politically? Which, in a dispiriting kind of Euro NewSpeak denies to all 
and sundry the nation-building aspect of European citizenship whilst, at the same time, 
appeals to a national understandings of citizenship expecting it to provide emotional and 
psychological attachments which are typical of those very constructs which are denied?  
Is it the discourse of civic responsibility and consequent political attachment at all? 
Or is it not closer to a market culture and the ethos of consumerism? Is it an unacceptable 
caricature to think of this discourse as giving expression to an ethos according to which the 
Union has become a product for which the managers, alarmed by customer dissatisfaction, 
are engaged in brand development. Citizenship and the "rights" associated with it are meant 
  15to give the product a new image (since it adds very little in substance) and make the product 
ever more attractive to its consumers, to reestablish their attachment to their favourite brand. 
The Union may belong to its citizens but no more, say, than a multinational corporation 
belongs to its shareholders. The introduction of citizenship on this reading is little more than 
a decision of the Board voting for an increased dividend as a way of placating restless 
shareholders.  
A word should be said about fundamental human rights and European citizenship. I 
myself will be arguing that human rights have an important place in the construction of a 
meaningful concept of European citizenship. But all too frequently in this discourse even 
human rights are commodified and represent just another goodie with which to placate a 
disaffected consumer of European integration. A first typical feature of most official 
discourse is the conflation of citizenship with (human) rights. This has become so natural 
that it seems both right and inevitable. I consider this conflation as part of the problem. If 
the problem is defined as alienation and disaffection towards the European construct by 
individuals and the medicine is European citizenship, an essential ingredient of this 
medicine becomes human rights, more rights, better rights, all in the hope of bringing the 
citizen "...closer to the Union." 
The official view is not only problematic in the way rights are conceived but also in 
the impact they are expected to have on individuals. On what basis is the claim made, again 
and again, that rights will make people closer to the Union? Even if there is some truth to 
that, the picture is, at a minimum far more complex in the current European context.  
I think rights do have that effect in transformative situations from, say, tyranny to 
emancipation. But that has long ceased to be the West European condition. Somewhat 
  16polemically let me make three points to illustrate that the nexus rights-closeness is not 
nearly as simple as the IGC literature suggests.  
Reflect on the following:  
Take, say, an Austrian or Italian national. Their human rights are protected by their 
constitution and by their constitutional court. As an additional safety net they are protected 
by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg organs. In the 
Community, they receive judicial protection from the ECJ using as it source the same 
Convention and the Constitutional Traditions common to the Member States. Many of the 
proposed European rights are similar to those which our citizen already enjoys in his or her 
national space. Even if we imagine that there is a lacuna of protection in the Community 
space, that would surely justify closing that lacuna -- but why would anyone imagine in a 
culture of rights saturation, not rights deprivation, that this would make the citizen any 
closer to the Community? Make no mistake: I do think the European human rights 
patrimony, national and transnational, has contributed to a sense of shared identity. But I 
think one has reached the point of diminishing returns. Simply adding new rights to the list, 
or adding lists of new rights, has little effect. Rights are taken for granted; if you managed to 
penetrate the general indifference towards the European construct against the exercise of 
power by public authority. The Rights culture, which I share, tends to think of this as 
positive. But, at least in part, at least psychologically, it might have the opposite effect to 
making the individual closer to "his" or "her" Union. After all, every time you clamor for 
more rights, which in this context are typically opposable against Community authorities, 
you are claiming that those rights are needed, in other words that the Union or Community 
pose a threat. You might be crying “Wolf” to score some political point, or you might be 
  17right. Either way, if you are signaling to the individual that he or she needs the rights since 
they are threatened, it is not exactly the stuff which will make them closer to ‘their’ Union 
or Community 
Finally, there is very little discussion of the divisive nature of rights, their 
"disintegration effect." Deciding on rights is often deciding on some of the deepest values of 
society. Even though we blithely talk about the common constitutional traditions, there are 
sharp differences within that common tradition. Some of the rights highest on the Christmas 
list of, say, the European Parliament, noble and justified as they may be, could if adopted for 
the Community be celebrated by the political culture in some Member States and regarded 
with suspicion and worse in other Member States. Remembering the Grogan v SPUC 
abortion saga, which the ECJ inelegantly, but perhaps wisely ducked, will drive home this 
point. 
Mine is not an anti-market view, the importance of which to European prosperity is 
acknowledged. But it is a view which is concerned with the degradation of the political 
process, of image trumping substance, of deliberative governance being replaced by a 
commodification of the political process, of consumer replacing the citizen, of a Saatchi & 
Saatchi European citizenship. To conceptualize European citizenship around needs, even 
needs as important as employment and rights is an end of millennium version of Bread and 
Circus politics. 
Towards the reconstruction of a European Ethos  
Do we need a European Citizenship at all? The importance of European citizenship 
is a lot more than a device for placating an alienated populace. It goes to the very 
foundations of political legitimacy.  
  18The European Union enjoys powers unparalleled by any other transnational entity. It 
is not a State but in its powers it is pretty close.  
It has, inter alia, the capacity  
-- to enact norms which create rights and obligations both for its Member States and 
their nationals, norms which are often directly effective and which are 
constitutionally supreme.  
-- to take decisions with major impact on the social and economic orientation of 
public life within the Member States and within Europe as a whole. 
-- to engage the Community and, consequently the Member States by international 
agreements with Third countries and international organizations. 
-- to spend significant amounts of public funds. 
 
Europe has exercised these capacities to a very considerable degree. Whence the 
authority to do all this and what is the nature of a polity which has these powers? 
One place to look for the answer would be -- international law: Let us discard this as 
artificial and formalistic. International Law can neither explain nor legitimate the reality of 
Community life. If not that, then what?  
In Western, liberal democracies public authority requires legitimation through one 
principal source: The citizens of the polity. The deepest, most clearly engraved hallmark of 
citizenship in our democracies is that power is vested in citizens, by majority, to create 
binding norms, to shape the socio-economic direction of the polity, in fact, all those powers 
and capacities which, I suggested, the Union now has. More realistically, power is vested in 
citizens to enable and habilitate representative institutions which will exercise governance 
on behalf of, and for, the citizens.  
Under our constitutional understanding of the Treaty--was that not what was 
achieved? I know that some believe this. Individuals as subjects? Lawyers recite dutifully 
that the Community constitutes a new legal order... for the benefit of which the states have 
  19limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which 
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.  
But note: Individuals are subjects only in the effect of the law. In this sense alone is 
it a new legal order. But you could create rights and afford judicial remedies to slaves. The 
ability to go to court to enjoy a right bestowed on you by pleasure of others does not 
emancipate you. Does not make you a citizen. Long before women or Jews were made 
citizens they enjoyed direct effect. Citizenship is not only about the politics of public 
authority. It is also about the social reality of peoplehood and the identity of the polity. 
Citizens constitute the demos of the polity -- citizenship is frequently, though not 
necessarily, conflated with nationality. This, then, is the other, collective side, of the 
citizenship coin. Demos provides another way of expressing the link between citizenship 
and democracy. Democracy does not exist in a vacuum. It is premised on the existence of a 
polity with members -- the demos -- by whom and for whom democratic discourse with its 
many variants takes place. The authority and legitimacy of a majority to compel a minority 
exists only within political boundaries defined by a demos. Simply put, if there is no demos, 
there can be no democracy.  
But this, in turn, raises the other big dilemma of citizenship: Who are to be the 
citizens of the European polity? How are we to define the relationships among them. A 
demos, a people cannot, after all be a bunch of strangers. Are we not back then to the 
changed Telos, to nation building and all that? How should we understand, then, and define 
the peoplehood of the European demos if we insist that the task remains the... ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe? 
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yourself to living in a polity which may provide you with bread and circus a-plenty but 
which lacks the core of individual political dignity and public legitimation. Adopt European 
Citizenship and fundamentally change the very Telos of European integration from its 
unique concept of Community to, frankly, a more banal notion of nation building. This is an 
unappealing choice. 
In offering a resolution I want to bring together three elements:  
I first want to re-articulate my understanding of the special nature - and identity! - of 
the European polity as encapsulated in the term supranationalism. It is the central concept 
for understanding the ethos of Europe, a key in the understanding of citizenship. Mine, as 
will appear, is a politically conservative view since it insists not simply on the inevitability 
of the nation-state but on its virtues. 
I will then restate the move of de-coupling nationality from citizenship a key idea 
which Closa, O'Leary, Ingram and others have helped explored in the context of European 
integration.  
Finally I shall re-couple them but in a specific European geometry. This geometry 
reflects - as citizenship should - the unique supranational values of the polity.  
In trying to explain the ways in which the Community is, or has become, supra-
national, most discussion over the years has tended, interestingly, to focus on its relation to 
the "state" rather than the "nation." This conflation of nation/state is not always helpful. 
Supranationalism relates in specific and discreet ways to nationhood and to statehood. To 
see the relationship between supranationalism, nationhood and statehood, I propose to focus 
in turn on nationhood and statehood and try and explore their promise and their dangers. 
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some of the old and new Masters Herder and Mazzini, Berlin, Arendt and Gelner, A.D. 
Smith and Tamir.  
It seems to me that, at least in its 19th century liberal conception, two deep human 
values are said to find expression in nationhood: Belongingness and Originality. (It should 
immediately be stated that nationhood is not the only social form in which these values may 
find expression.) 
Belongingness is inherent in nationhood, nationhood is a form of belonging. 
Nationhood is not an instrument to obtain belongingness, it is it.  
What are the values embedded in belonging, in national belonging, beyond the 
widely shared view that belonging is pleasant, is good? We can readily understand a certain 
basic appeal to our human species which is, arguably, inherently social: the appeal that 
family and tribe have, too. Part of the appeal is, simply, the provision of a framework for 
social interaction. But surely one has to go beyond that: after all, much looser social 
constructs than nationhood, let alone tribe and family, could provide that framework. 
Belonging means, of course, more than that. It means a place, a social home.  
The belonging of nationhood is both like and unlike the bonds of blood in family and 
tribe and in both this likeness and unlikeness we may find a clue to some of its underlying 
values. 
It is like the "bonds of blood" in family and tribe in that those who are of the nation 
have their place, are accepted, belong, independently of their achievements -- by just being -
- and herein lies the powerful appeal (and terrible danger) of belonging of this type -- it is a 
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the drama and awesomeness of its opposites: isolation, seclusion, excommunication. 
But nationhood transcends the family and tribe, and maybe here lurks an even more 
tantalizing value: Nationhood not only offers a place to the familyless, to the tribeless, but in 
transcending family and tribe it calls for loyalty -- the largest coin in the realm of national 
feeling -- towards others which go beyond the immediate "natural" (blood) or self-interested 
social unit.  
And, indeed, belongingness of this type is a two way street. It is not only a passive 
value: to be accepted. It is also active: to accept. Loyalty is one of those virtues which, if not 
abused, benefits both those on the giving and receiving ends.  
Ironically, the artificial belonging of nationality, once it sheds its ethnic and 
culturally repressive baggage, has an altogether more poignant meaning in the age of 
multiculturalism. Precisely in an epoch in which individuals and groups develop myriad 
identity referents and in which a culture of rights and entitlement invites social dislocation - 
its artificiality gives it its bridging potential.  
This is the place to acknowledge, too, the virtues of autochthony - the nexus to place 
and land, the much maligned Soil. Blood and Soil have, of course, horrific associations 
which need no exploring here. But not only must we acknowledge the hold which the spatial 
has in conditioning perception, sensibility and, hence, identity. One must also realize the 
appeal and virtue of autochthony as an anti-dote to the fragmentation of the post-modern 
condition. 
The other core value of nationhood, in some ways also an instrument for national 
demarcation, is the claim about originality. On this reading, the Tower of Babel was not a 
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aftermath, not punishment, but divine blessing. In shorthand, the nation, with its endlessly 
rich specificities, coexisting alongside other nations, is, in this view, the vehicle for realizing 
human potentialities in original ways, ways which humanity as a whole would be the poorer 
for not cultivating. 
It is here that one may turn from the nation to the modern state. It is worth 
remembering at the outset that national existence and even national vibrancy do not in and 
of themselves require statehood, though statehood can offer the nation advantages, both 
intrinsic as well as advantages resulting from the current organization of international life 
which gives such huge benefits to statehood. 
I would argue that in the modern notion of the European organic-national nation-
state, the state is to be seen principally as an instrument, the organizational framework 
within which the nation is to realize its potentialities. It is within the Statal framework that 
governance, with its most important functions of securing welfare and security, is situated. 
The well-being and integrity of the state must, thus, be secured so that these functions may 
be attained. That is not a meager value in itself. But to the extent that the state may claim, 
say, a loyalty which is more than pragmatic, it is because it is at the service of the nation 
with its values of belongingness and originality (this conceptualization underscores, perhaps 
exaggerates, the difference with the American truly radical alternative liberal project of the 
non-ethno-national polity, and of a state, the Republic, the organization of which, and the 
norms of citizenship behavior within, were central to its value system). It is evident, 
however, that in the European project, boundaries become a very central feature of the 
nation-state. There are, obviously, boundaries in the legal-geographical sense of separating 
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society (the nation) and individuals come to think of themselves in the world.  
At a societal level, nationhood involves the drawing of boundaries by which the 
nation will be defined and separated from others. The categories of boundary-drawing are 
myriad: linguistic, ethnic, geographic, religious etc. The drawing of the boundaries is 
exactly that: a constitutive act, which decides that certain boundaries are meaningful both 
for the sense of belonging and for the original contribution of the nation. This constitutive 
element is particularly apparent at the moment of "nation building" when histories are 
rewritten, languages revived etc. Of course, with time, the boundaries, especially the non-
geographical ones, write themselves on collective and individual consciousness with such 
intensity that they appear as natural -- consider the virtual interchangeability of the word 
international with universal and global: It is hard not to think, in the social sphere, of the 
world as a whole without the category of nation (as in international). Finally, at an 
individual level, belonging implies a boundary: You belong because others do not.  
As evident as the notion of boundaries is to the nation-state enterprise, so is the high 
potential for abuse of boundaries. The abuse may take place in relation to the three principal 
boundaries: The external boundary of the State, the boundary between nation and state and 
the internal consciousness boundary of those making up the nation. The most egregious 
form of abuse of the external boundary of the State would be physical or other forms of 
aggression towards other states. 
The abuse of the boundary between nation and state is most egregious when the state 
comes to be seen not as instrumental for individuals and society to realize their potentials 
but as an end in itself. Less egregiously, the State might induce a 'laziness' in the nation - 
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expression. This may also have consequences for the sense of belongingness whereby the 
apparatus of the State becomes a substitute to a meaningful sense of belonging. An 
allegiance to the State can replace human affinity, empathy, loyalty and sense of shared fate 
with the people of the State.  
There can be, too, an abuse of the internal boundary which defines belongingness. 
The most typical abuse here is to move from a boundary which defines a sense of belonging 
to one which induces a sense of superiority and a concomitant sense of condescension or 
contempt for the other. A sense of collective national identity implies an other. It should not 
imply an inferior other.  
In the attitude to the land, which finds legal expression in the concept of national 
territory, both the virtues and dangers of nationalism find powerful expression. The national 
land, the homeland, the fatherland, the motherland, 'belongs' to the nation - and to no one 
else. Ownership, whether constructed or innate, is one of the most potent modes of 
attachment. Cultivating the feeling of collective, symbolic, ownership over land is intended 
not only to enhance a sense of attachment to place and willingness to make sacrifices for it, 
but is also an important part of social attachment among 'co-owners.' and, thus, an important 
part of the special sense of national 'belongingness' (Clearly it also mediates the huge 
disparities in private, 'real' ownership of land). Land plays, too, an important part in national 
originality. So much of the culture, highbrow and low, is a reflection of geography and 
topography and of associated phenomena such as climate. At the same time, the role of 
territory in the pathologies of nationalism is a living part of the history of the European 
nation-states and their murderous quarrels which is so well known as to obviate discussion. 
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attempt to control the excesses of the modern nation-state in Europe, especially, but not 
only, its propensity to violent conflict and the inability of the international system to 
constrain that propensity. The European Community was to be an antidote to the negative 
features of the state and Statal intercourse and its establishment in 1951 was seen as the 
beginning of a process that would bring about the elimination of these excesses.  
Historically there have always been those two competing visions of European 
Integration. Whilst no one has seriously envisioned a Jacobean type centralized Europe, it is 
clear that one vision, to which I have referred as the Unity vision, the United States of 
Europe vision, has really posited as its ideal type, as its aspiration, a Statal Europe, albeit of 
a federal kind. Tomorrow's Europe in this form would indeed constitute the final demise of 
Member State nationalism replacing or placing the hitherto warring Member States within a 
political union of federal governance.  
It is easy to see some of the faults of this vision: It would be more than ironic if a 
polity set up as a means to counter the excesses of statism ended up coming round full circle 
and transforming itself into a (super) state. It would be equally ironic if the ethos which 
rejected the boundary abuse of the nation-state, gave birth to a polity with the same potential 
for abuse. The problem with this Unity vision is that its very realization entails its negation. 
The alternative vision, the one that historically has prevailed, is the supranational 
vision, the community vision. At one level aspirations here are both modest compared to the 
Union model and reactionary: Supranationalism, the notion of community rather than unity, 
is about affirming the values of the liberal nation-state by policing the boundaries against 
abuse. Another way of saying this would be that Supranationalism aspires to keep the values 
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conservative modernist vision since it does not reject boundaries: it guards them but it also 
guards against them.  
At another level the supranational community project is far more ambitious than the 
Unity one and far more radical. It is more ambitious since, unlike the Unity project which 
simply wishes to redraw the actual political boundaries of the polity within the existing 
nation-state conceptual framework, albeit federal, the supranational project seeks to redefine 
the very notion of boundaries of the State, between the Nation and State, and within the 
Nation itself. It is more radical since, as I shall seek to show, it involves more complex 
demands and greater constraints on the actors. 
How, then, does Supranationalism, expressed in the community project of European 
integration, affect the excesses of the nation-state, the abuse of boundaries discussed above? 
At the pure Statal level supranationalism replaces the "liberal" premise of 
international society with a community one. The classical model of international law is a 
replication at the international level of a liberal theory of the state. The state is implicitly 
treated as the analogue, on the international level, to the individual within a domestic 
situation. In this conception, international legal notions such as self-determination, 
sovereignty, independence, and consent have their obvious analogy in theories of the 
individual within the state. In the supranational vision, the community as a transnational 
regime will not simply be a neutral arena in which states will seek to pursue the national 
interest and maximize their benefits but will create a tension between the state and the 
Community of states. Crucially, the community idea is not meant to eliminate the national 
state but to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new discipline. 
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the international sphere. 
Turning to the boundary between nation and state supranationalism is meant to 
prevent abuses here, too. The supranational project recognizes that at an inter-group level 
nationalism is an expression of cultural (political and/or other) specificity underscoring 
differentiation, the uniqueness of a group as positioned vis-á-vis other groups, calling for 
respect and justifying the maintenance of inter-group boundaries. At an intra-group level 
nationalism is an expression of cultural (political and/or other) specificity underscoring 
commonality, the "sharedness" of the group vis-á-vis itself, calling for loyalty and justifying 
elimination of intra-group boundaries. 
But, crucially, nationality is not the thing itself -- it is its expression, an artifact. It is 
a highly stylized artifact, with an entire apparatus of norms and habits; above all it is not a 
spontaneous expression of that which it signifies but a code of what it is meant to give 
expression to, frequently even translated into legal constructs. Nationality is inextricably 
linked to citizenship, citizenship not simply as the code for group identity, but also as a 
package of legal rights and duties, and of social attitudes. 
Supranationalism does not seek to negate as such the interplay of differentiation and 
commonality, of inclusion and exclusion and their potential value. But it is a challenge to 
the codified expressions in nationality. Since, in the supranational construct with its free 
movement provisions which do not allow exclusion through Statal means of other national 
cultural influences and with its strict prohibition on nationality/citizenship based 
discrimination, national differentiation can not rest so easily on the artificial boundaries 
provided by the State. At intergroup level then it pushes for cultural differences to express 
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At the intra-group level it attempts to strip the false consciousness which nationalism may 
create instead of belongingness derived from a non-formal sense of sharedness. This, 
perhaps, is the first Kantian strand in this conceptualization of supranationalism. Kantian 
moral philosophy grounds moral obligation on the ability of humans not simply to follow 
ethical norms, but, as rational creatures, to determine for themselves the laws of their own 
acting and to act out of internal choice according to these norms. Supranationalism on our 
view favours national culture when, indeed, it is authentic, internalized, a true part of 
identity.  
There is another, Enlightenment, Kantian idea in this discourse. Supranationalism at 
the societal and individual, rather than the Statal level, embodies an ideal which diminishes 
the importance of the Statal aspects of nationality -- probably the most powerful 
contemporary expression of groupness -- as the principal referent for transnational human 
intercourse. That is the value side of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, of free 
movement provisions and the like. Hermann Cohen, the great neo-Kantian, in his Religion 
der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, tries to explain the meaning of the Mosaic law 
which call for non-oppression of the stranger. In his vision, the alien is to be protected, not 
because he was a member of one's family, clan religious community or people, but because 
he was a human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of humanity.  
We see through this exquisite exegesis that in the curtailment of the totalistic claim 
of the nation-State and the reduction of nationality as the principle referent for human 
intercourse, the Community ideal of Supranationalism is evocative of, and resonates with, 
Enlightenment ideas, with the privileging of the individual, with a different aspect of 
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the Community ideal is heir to Enlightenment liberalism. Supranationalism assumes a new, 
additional meaning which refers not to the relations among nations but to the ability of the 
individual to rise above his or her national closet. 
And yet, at the same moment we understand that these very values, which find their 
legal and practical expression in, e.g., enhanced mobility, breakdown of local markets, and 
insertion of universal norms into domestic culture are also part of the deep modern and post-
modern anxiety of European belongingness and part of the roots of European angst and 
alienation. This is, perhaps, the deepest paradox of European citizenship. 
Towards a Reconstruction of European Citizenship - Three Views of Multiple Demoi 
How does this help us in the construction of European citizenship and demos and the 
resolution of that crucial choice? It is here that I will try and give normative meaning to the 
Citizenship Clause in Maastricht and Amsterdam: 
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality 
of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union [Maastricht] Citizenship of the Union shall 
complement and not replace national citizenship [Amsterdam]. 
As mentioned, the introduction of citizenship to the conceptual world of the Union 
could be seen as just another step in the drive towards a Statal, unity vision of Europe, 
especially if citizenship is understood as being premised on a Statal understanding of 
nationality. But there is another more tantalizing and radical way of understanding the 
provision, namely as the very conceptual decoupling of nationality from citizenship and as 
the conception of a polity the demos of which, its membership, is understood in the first 
place in civic and political rather than ethno-cultural terms. On this view, the Union belongs 
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substance of membership (and thus of the demos) is in a commitment to the shared values of 
the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment, inter alia, to the duties 
and rights of a civic society covering discrete areas of public life, a commitment to 
membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposites of nationalism -- those human 
features which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism. On this reading, the 
conceptualization of a European demos should not be based on real or imaginary trans-
European cultural affinities or shared histories nor on the construction of a European 
"national" myth of the type which constitutes the identity of the organic nation. European 
citizenship should not be thought of either as intended to create the type of emotional 
attachments associated with nationality based citizenship. The decoupling of nationality and 
citizenship opens the possibility, instead, of thinking of co-existing multiple demoi. I will 
present several possibilities of this, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
One view of multiple demoi may consist in what may be called the "concentric 
circles" approach. On this approach one feels simultaneously as belonging to, and being part 
of, say, Germany and Europe; or, even, Scotland, Britain and Europe. What characterizes 
this view is that the sense of identity and identification derives from the same sources of 
human attachment albeit at different levels of intensity. Presumably the most intense (which 
the nation, and State, always claims to be) would and should trump in normative conflict.  
The problem with this view is that it invites us to regard European citizenship in the 
same way that we understand our national citizenship. This was precisely the fallacy of the 
German Constitutional Court in its Maastricht decision: Conceptualizing the European 
demos in the way that the German demos is conceptualized. 
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belonging simultaneously to two demoi, based, critically, on different subjective factors of 
identification, in the way someone may regard himself or herself as being German and 
Catholic. I may be a German national in the in-reaching strong sense of organic-cultural 
identification and sense of belongingness. I am simultaneously a European citizen in terms 
of my European transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-national 
diversity.  
On this view, the Union demos turns away from its antecedents and understanding in 
the European nation-state. But equally, it should be noted that I am suggesting here 
something that is different than simple American Republicanism transferred to Europe.  The 
values one is discussing may be seen to have a special European specificity, a specificity I 
have explored elsewhere but one dimension of which, by simple way of example, could 
most certainly be that strand of mutual social responsibility embodied in the ethos of the 
Welfare State adopted by all European societies and by all political forces. Human rights as 
embodied in the European Convention of Human Rights would constitute another strand in 
this matrix of values as would, say, the ban on discrimination on grounds of nationality and 
all the rest. 
But this view, too, has its problems. In the first place it is not clear how this matrix 
of values would be qualitatively different from the normal artifacts of constitutional 
democracy practiced in most European nation States. After all, all of them are signatories to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, all of them, to varying degrees share in those 
"European values." Secondly, a communities of value expressed in these terms provides a 
rather thin, even if laudable, content to the notion of citizenship. And as A.D. Smith 
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history and/or real kinship, a real sense of membership is hard to come by._ It is noticeable 
that even national polities who supposedly understand themselves as communities of values, 
such as France or the United States, cannot avoid in their evolution, self-understanding and 
even self-definition many of the features of communities of fate.  
I want to offer a third version of the multiple demoi, one of true variable geometry. It 
is like the second version in one crucial respect: It too invites individuals to see themselves 
as belonging simultaneously to two demoi, based, critically, on different subjective factors 
of identification. And in this version too the invitation is to embrace the national in the in-
reaching strong sense of organic-cultural identification and belongingness and to embrace 
the European in terms of European transnational affinities to shared values which transcend 
the ethno-national diversity. 
But there are too critical differences. One can be German without being Catholic. 
One can be Catholic without being German. In this model of European citizenship, the 
concepts of Member State nationality and European citizenship are totally interdependent. 
One cannot, conceptually and psychologically (let alone legally) be a European citizen 
without being a Member State national. It is in this respect the mirror of my analysis of 
Supranationalism itself, which, as I was at pains to argue, had no ontological independence 
but was part and parcel of the national project, in some way its gate keeper. 
There is a second critical difference to this model of multiple demoi: Its matrix of 
values is not simply the material commitment to social solidarity, to human rights and other 
such values which, as I argued, would hardly differentiate it from the modern constitutional, 
West European liberal state. It has a second important civilizatory dimension. It is the 
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legitimacy and authority of decisions adopted by fellow European citizens in the realization 
that in these areas preference is given to choices made by the outreaching, non organic, 
demos, rather than by the inreaching one. The Treaties on this reading would have to be 
seen not only as an agreement among states (a Union of States) but as a "social contract" 
among the nationals of those states -- ratified in accordance with the constitutional 
requirements in all Member States -- that they will in the areas covered by the Treaty regard 
themselves as associating as citizens in a broader society. But crucially, this view preserves 
the boundaries, preserves the Self and preserves the Other. But it attempts to educate the I to 
reach to that Other. We can go even further. In this polity, and to this demos, one cardinal 
value is precisely that there will not be a drive towards, or an acceptance of, an over-arching 
organic-cultural national identity displacing those of the Member States. Nationals of the 
Member States are European Citizens, not the other way around. Europe is "not yet" a 
demos in the organic national-cultural sense and should never become one. The value matrix 
has, thus, two civilizing strands: Material and processual. One that subordinates the 
individual and the national society to certain values and certain decisional procedures 
representing a broader range of interests and sensibilities. Of course the two are connected. 
We are willing to submit aspects of our social ordering to a polity composed of "others" 
precisely because we are convinced that in some material sense they share our basic values. 
It is a construct which is designed to encourage certain virtues of tolerance and humanity.  
One should not get carried away with this construct. Note first that the Maastricht 
formula does not imply a full decoupling: Member States are free to define their own 
conditions of membership and these may continue to be defined in national terms. But one 
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each Member State. I have already argued: A nationalism which seeks to overwhelm the self 
has been a major source of bigotry and prejudice. A nationalism which acknowledges the 
multicultural self, can be a positive unifying concept. On this reading European citizenship 
as a reflection of Supranationalism can be regarded as part of the Liberal Nation project. 
That, in my view, is the greatest promise of introducing supranational citizenship into a 
construct the major components of which continue to be States and nations. The National 
and the Supranational encapsulate on this reading two of the most elemental, alluring and 
frightening social and psychological poles of our cultural heritage. The national is Eros: 
Reaching back to the pre-modern, appealing to the heart with a grasp on our emotions, and 
evocative of the romantic vision of creative social organization as well as responding to our 
existential yearning for a meaning located in time and space. The nation, through its myths, 
provides a past and a future. And it is always a history and a destiny in a place, in a territory, 
a narrative that is fluid and fixed at the same time. The dangers are self-evident. The 
Supranational is Civilization: Confidently modernist, appealing to the rational within us and 
to Enlightenment neo-classical humanism, taming that Eros. Importantly, the relationship is 
circular - for its very modernism and rationalism is what, as I sought to show earlier, is 
alienating, and would have but an ambivalent appeal if it was to represent alone the content 
of European identity.  
Martin Heidegger is an unwitting ironic metaphor for the difficulty of negotiating 
between these poles earlier in this Century. His rational, impersonal critique of totalistic 
rationality and of modernity retain powerful lessons to this day; but equally powerful is the 
lesson from his fall: An irrational, personal embracing of an irrational, romantic pre-modern 
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failing). 
For some European citizenship is an icon signifying the hope of transcending State 
and national society altogether. For others it is no more than a symbol for the demise of the 
classical European Nation-State in the bureaucratic, globalized market. For others still it is 
the icon of a shrewd, Machiavelli-like scheme of self-preservation of the same Statal 
structure which has dominated Europe for a century and more. Finally it could be regarded 
as emblematic of that new liberal effort which seeks to retain the Eros of the national its 
demonic aspects under civilizatory constraints.  
Democracy and European Integration - To be a Good European Citizen 
The discourse of democracy, too, takes an additional significance in this context. The 
primary democratic imperative is in bestowing legitimacy on a "formation" - the Union - 
which, want it or not, exercises manifold state functions. It was this imperative from which 
the search for demos and European citizenship emerged. But now we have seen that our 
construct of European citizenship was also seen as having a particular supranational 
educational, civilizing function, by submitting certain aspects of our national autonomy to a 
community which in significant aspects is a community of "others." But the civilizing 
impulse would, surely, be lost if in the Community decisional process, the individual 
became totally lost, and instead of a deliberative engagement across differences we had 
bureaucratic subordination.  
The question remains then, what, if anything, can be done to operationalize and 
particularly empower individuals in Europe in their capacity as citizens. This is not the place 
to rehearse the full litany of the European democratic deficit. But clearly, on any reading, as 
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the very creation of "European Citizenship", there has been a distinct disempowerment of 
the individual European citizen, the specific gravity of whom continues to decline as the 
Union grows. The roots of disempowerment are many but three stand out. 
First is surely the inability of the Community and Union to develop structures and 
processes which adequately replicate at the Community level the habits of governmental 
control, parliamentary accountability and administrative responsibility which are practiced 
with different modalities in the various Member States. Further, as more and more functions 
move to Brussels, the democratic balances within the Member States have been disrupted by 
a strengthening of the Ministerial and Executive branches of government. The value of each 
individual in the political process has inevitably declined including the ability to play a 
meaningful civic role in European governance.  
The second root goes even deeper and concerns the ever increasing remoteness, 
opaqueness, and inaccessibility of European governance. An apocryphal statement usually 
attributed to Jacques Delors predicts that by the end of the decade eighty percent of social 
regulation will issue from Brussels. We are on target. The drama lies in the fact that no 
accountable public authority one has a handle on these regulatory processes. Not the 
European Parliament, not the Commission, not even the Governments. The press and other 
media, a vital Estate in our democracies are equally hampered. Consider that it is even 
impossible to get from any of the Community Institutions an authoritative and mutually 
agreed statement of the mere number of committees which inhabit that world of 
Comitology. Once there were those who worried about the supranational features of 
European integration. It is time to worry about infranationalism - a complex network of 
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bodies with unequal and unfair access to a process with huge social and economic 
consequences to everyday life - in matters of public safety, health, and all other dimensions 
of socio-economic regulation. Transparency and access to documents are often invoked as a 
possible remedy to this issue. But if you do not know what is going on, which documents 
will you ask to see? Neither strengthening the European Parliament nor national Parliaments 
will do much to address this problem of post-modern governance which itself is but one 
manifestation of a general sense of political alienation in most Western democracies.  
Another issue relates to the competences of the Union and Community. In one of its 
most celebrated cases in the early 60s the European Court of Justice described the 
Community as a "...new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields." There is a widespread anxiety that these fields are 
limited no more. Indeed, not long ago a prominent European scholar and judge has written 
that there "...simply is no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, 
against the Community." We should not, thus, be surprised by a continuing sense of 
alienation from the Union and its Institutions. 
I want to conclude by discussing some proposals concerning the technology of 
transnational democracy. It is not, of course, my contention that such proposals would 
actually solve the vexed problems of the European democracy deficit. They are intended as 
illustrations, taken from a wide-ranging study on European governance submitted to the 
European Parliament_, of the type of mechanisms which focus specifically on the 
transnational dimension of democratic governance. In my view, each one of them means a 
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some as a major achievement for democracy in Europe.  
•  Proposal 1: The European Legislative Ballot 
The democratic tradition in most Member States is one of Representative 
Democracy. Our elected representatives legislate and govern in our name. If we are 
unsatisfied we can replace them at election time. Recourse to forms of Direct Democracy - 
such as referenda -- are exceptional. Given the size of the Union referenda are considered 
particularly inappropriate.  
However, the basic condition of Representative Democracy is, indeed, that at 
election time the citizens "...can throw the scoundrels out" -- that is replace the Government. 
This basic feature of Representative Democracy does not exist in the Community and 
Union. The form of European Governance is - and will remain for considerable time - such 
that there is no "Government" to throw out. Even dismissing the Commission by Parliament 
(or approving the appointment of the Commission President) is not the equivalent of 
throwing the Government out. There is no civic act of the European citizen where he or she 
can influence directly the outcome of any policy choice facing the Community and Union as 
citizens can when choosing between parties which offer sharply distinct programmes. 
Neither elections to the European Parliament nor elections to national Parliaments fulfill this 
function in Europe. This is among the reasons why turnout to European Parliamentary 
elections has been traditionally low and why these elections are most commonly seen as a 
mid-term judgment of the Member State governments rather than a choice on European 
governance.  
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as one could speak of meaningful representative democracy at the European level. Our 
proposal is for a form of a Legislative Ballot Initiative coinciding with elections to the 
European Parliament. Our proposal is allow the possibility, when enough signatures are 
collected in, say, more than five Member States to introduce legislative initiatives to be 
voted on by citizens when European Elections take place (and, after a period of 
experimentation possibly at other intervals too.) In addition to voting for their MEPs, the 
electorate will be able to vote on these legislative initiatives. Results would be binding on 
the Community Institutions and on Member States. Initiatives would be, naturally, confined 
to the sphere of application of Community law -- i.e. in areas where the Community 
Institutions could have legislated themselves. Such legislation could be overturned by a 
similar procedure or by a particularly onerous legislative Community process. The 
Commission, Council, Parliament or a National Parliament could refer a proposed initiative 
to the European Court of Justice to determine - in an expedited procedure -- whether the 
proposed Ballot initiative is within the Competences of the Community or is in any other 
way contrary to the Treaty. In areas where the Treaty provides for majority voting the Ballot 
initiative will be considered as adopted when it wins a majority of votes in the Union as a 
whole as well as within a majority of Member States. (Other formulae could be explored). 
Where the Treaty provides for unanimity a Majority of voters in the Union would be 
required as well as winning in all Member States.  
Apart from enhancing symbolically and tangibly the voice of individuals qua 
citizens, this proposal would encourage the formation of true European Parties as well as 
transnational mobilization of political forces. It would give a much higher European 
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important step, practical and symbolic, to the notion of European Citizenship and Civic 
Responsibility. 
•  Proposal 2: Lexcalibur - The European Public Square. 
This would be the single most important and far reaching proposal which would 
have the most dramatic impact on European governance. It does not require a Treaty 
amendment and can be adopted by an Inter-Institutional Agreement among Commission, 
Council and Parliament. It could be put in place in phases after a short period of study and 
experimentation and be fully operational within, I estimate, two to three years. I believe that 
if adopted and implemented it will, in the medium and long term, have a greater impact on 
the democratization and transparency of European governance than any other single 
proposal currently under discussion.  
I am proposing that - with few exceptions - the entire decision-making process of the 
Community, especially but not only Comitology - be placed on the Internet.  
For convenience I have baptized the proposal: Lexcalibur - The European Public 
Square. 
I should immediately emphasize that what I have in mind is a lot more than simply 
making certain laws or documents such as the Official Journal more accessible through 
electronic data bases.  
I should equally emphasize that this proposal is without prejudice to the question of 
confidentiality of process and secrecy of documents. As shall transpire, under our proposal 
documents or deliberations which are considered too sensitive to be made public at any 
given time could be shielded behind "fire-walls" and made inaccessible to the general 
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Lexcalibur. 
The key organizational principle would be that each Community decision making 
project intended to result in the eventual adoption of a Community norms would have a 
"decisional web site" on the Internet within the general Lexcalibur Home-Page which would 
identify the scope and purpose of the legislative or regulatory measure(s); the Community 
and Member States persons or administrative departments or divisions responsible for the 
process; the proposed and actual time table of the decisional process so that one would know 
at any given moment the progress of the process; access and view all non-confidential 
documents which are part of the process; under carefully designed procedures directly 
submit input into the specific decisional process. But it is important to emphasize that our 
vision is not one of "Virtual Government" which will henceforth proceed electronically. The 
primary locus and mode of governance would and should remain intact: Political 
Institutions, meetings of elected representative and officials, Parliamentary debates, media 
reporting - as vigorous and active a Public Square as it is possible to maintain, and a 
European Civic Society of real human beings. The huge potential importance of Lexcalibur 
would be in its Secondary Effect: It would enhance the potential of all actors to play a much 
more informed, critical and involved role in the Primary Public Square. The most immediate 
direct beneficiaries of Euro Governance on the Internet would in fact be the media, 
interested pressure groups, NGO's and the like. Of course also "ordinary citizens" would 
have a much more direct mode to interact with their process of government. Providing a 
greatly improved system of information would, however, only be a first step of a larger 
project. It would serve as the basis for a system that allows widespread participation in 
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posting of comments and the opening of a dialogue between the Community institutions and 
interested private actors. The Commission already now sometimes invites e-mail comments 
on its initiatives. Such a system obviously needs a clear structure in order to allow a 
meaningful and effective processing of incoming information for Community institutions. 
Conceivable would be, for example, a two-tier system, consisting of a forum with limited 
access for an interactive exchange between Community Institutions and certain private 
actors and an open forum where all interested actors can participate and discuss Community 
policies with each other. This would open the unique opportunity for deliberations of 
citizens and interest groups beyond the traditional frontiers of the nation state, without the 
burden of high entry costs for the individual actor.  
Hugely important, in our view, will be the medium and long term impact on the 
young generation, our children. For this generation, the Internet will be - in many cases 
already is - as natural a medium as to older generations were radio, television and the press. 
European Governance on the Net will enable them to experience government at school and 
at home in ways which are barely imaginable to an older generation for whom this New Age 
"stuff" is often threatening or, in itself, alien. 
The idea of using the Internet for improving the legitimacy of the European Union 
may seem to some revolutionary and in some respects it is. Therefore its introduction should 
be organic through a piecemeal process of experiment and re-evaluation but within an 
overall commitment towards more open and accessible government.  
There are dimensions of the new Information Age which have all the scary aspects of 
a "Brave New World" in which individual and group autonomy and privacy are lost, in 
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remote and beyond comprehension and grasp - the perfect setting for alienation captured 
most visibly by atomized individuals sitting in front of their screens and "surfing the net."  
Ours is a vision which tries to enhance human sovereignty, demystify technology 
and place it firmly as servant and not master. The Internet in our vision is to serve as the true 
starting point for the emergence of a functioning deliberative political community, in other 
words a European polity cum civic society. For those who wish to see what this might look 
like my collaborators and I have prepared a simulation of Excalibur: 
http://www.iue.it/AEL/EP/Lex/index.html 
•  Proposal 3: The European Constitutional Council 
The Problem of Competences is, in our view, mostly one of perception. The 
perception has set in that the boundaries which were meant to circumscribe the areas in 
which the Community could operate have been irretrievably breached. Few perceptions have 
been more detrimental to the legitimacy of the Community in the eyes of its citizens. And 
not only its citizens. Governments and even Courts, for example the German Constitutional 
Court, have rebelled against the Community constitutional order because, in part, of a 
profound dissatisfaction on this very issue. One cannot afford to sweep this issue under the 
carpet. The crisis is already there. The main problem, then, is not one of moving the 
boundary lines but of restoring faith in the inviolability of the boundaries between 
Community and Member State competences.  
Any proposal which envisages the creation of a new Institution is doomed in the eyes 
of some. And yet I propose the creation of a Constitutional Council for the Community, 
modeled in some ways on its French namesake. The Constitutional Council would have 
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French cousin, decide cases submitted to it after a law was adopted but before coming into 
force. It could be seized by any Commission, Council, any Member State or by the 
European Parliament acting on a Majority of its Members. I think that serious consideration 
should be given to allowing Member State Parliaments to bring cases before the 
Constitutional Council.  
The composition of the Council is the key to its legitimacy. Its President would be 
the President of the European Court of Justice and its Members would be sitting members of 
the constitutional courts or their equivalents in the Member States. Within the European 
Constitutional Council no single Member State would have a veto power. All its decisions 
would be by majority. 
The composition of the European Constitutional Council would, I believe, help 
restore confidence in the ability to have effective policing of the boundaries as well as 
underscore that the question of competences is fundamentally also one of national 
constitutional norms but still subject to a binding and uniform solution by a Union 
Institution. It would underscore the interlocking variable geometry of the supranational 
construct. 
I know that this proposal might be taken as an assault on the integrity of the 
European Court of Justice. That attitude would, in our view, be mistaken. The question of 
competences has become so politicized that the European Court of Justice should welcome 
having this hot potato removed from its plate by an ex-ante decision of that other body with 
a jurisdiction limited to that preliminary issue. Yes, there is potential for conflict of 
jurisprudence and all the rest - nothing that competent drafting cannot deal with.  
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To raise the spectre of direct European taxation is to feed the worst fears of final 
collapse of national sovereignty. But from the perspective of citizenship the problem of the 
Union is, in some respect one of Representation (flawed, to be sure) with No Taxation. The 
subjecthood of individuals as non-citizens is no more evident in the financing of the Union. 
Revenues derive from levies on imports and exports and, principally, from State transfers 
from VAT receipts. So, like the political process itself, though it is the money of individuals 
which the State collects, it is the money of the State which is transferred to the Union. One 
speaks of the British contribution or the Danish contribution to the European Union, even if, 
ultimately, it is money of individuals. What if Community financing or a portion of it 
derived directly from income tax and that portion would be designated as such -- like social 
security contributions? This is a proposal which will be rejected by all concerned. The 
States because of the empowerment of the Union to levy direct taxation; the Union because 
it will fear the wrath of the taxpayers who might suddenly take an interest in the finances of 
the beast; The individual because they will have, directly, to shell out. But taxation, 
although levied on residents too, is a classical and meaningful artifact of citizenship: It 
instills accountability, it provokes citizen interest, it becomes an electoral issue, par 
excellence. It also established a duty - even an unpleasant one, towards the polity. Choosing 
between MEPs and parties will no longer be just an extension on local politics and national 
preferences.  
Finally, there is one dimension where rights, in their positive law dimension, may be 
directly relevant to the discourse of citizenship. In the run-up to the IGC practically all 
Institutions and parties interested in the IGC put on their Christmas lists, their pet rights. 
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"inclusion of an explicit reference in the Treaty to the principle of equal treatment 
irrespective of race, sex, age, handicap or religion (including mentioning the fundamental 
social rights of workers set out in the Charter, enlarging upon them and extending them to 
all citizens of the Union... "et cetera or, in equally ambiguous language "... the Treaty should 
contain a clear rejection of racism, xenophobia, sexism discrimination on grounds of a 
person's sexual orientation, anti-Semitism, revisionism and all forms of discrimination and 
guarantee adequate protection against discrimination for all individuals resident within the 
EU.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam, in extremely guarded language, allows the Council acting 
unanimously and only within the powers conferred on the Community to adopt measures 
designed to combat various forms of discrimination. The unmentioned default position of 
classic non-discrimination provisions is that they give guarantees against actions of 
Community authorities and, in some restricted circumstances elaborated by the ECJ, against 
Member State acts when the Member States are acting on behalf of the Community or acting 
in derogation of one of the four fundamental economic freedoms. Typically, the human 
rights apparatus does not apply horizontally as among individuals. Rights conceived in this 
way give but do not take from individual citizens. But the problem of racism, xenophobia 
and the like do not, on the whole, derive from acts of public authorities. The proposal I am 
suggesting is for the Council to target some of these rights, and model them on Article 119 
by introducing legislation which would prohibit certain conduct among individuals in, say, 
the workplace, or other zones of commercial activities such as housing or employment. In 
this way, the right of the individual against public authority is converted into a duty towards 
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(even if the duty extends to non citizens as well) by asking something tangible of European 
citizens as part of that status. 
It is no more appropriate to end this reflection on European citizenship with the 
grandiose concept than with the programmatic proposal. In some respects they are equally 
"unrealistic", equally bombastic. To its credit, I think, in the modern evolution of European 
integration ideas of both types have mattered. These are mine, for what they are worth.  
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